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Abstract
Research linking democratization, institutional strength, and war prescribes the construction of strong central
government institutions prior to mass elections as a prime mechanism for mitigating the danger of
international belligerency associated with democratization. However, institutional analysis of the
democratization – war linkage skews institutional strength measures in favour of the executive, overlooking
the other arms of government. Drawing on Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 – 2011 internationalized post-election civil
conflict, which was largely engendered by excessive executive powers and limited legislative leverage, this
paper quantitatively evaluates the effect state legislatures bear on the democratization – war linkage. The
evaluations yield at least some evidence for the postulated influence of state legislatures. Thus, whilst heeding
extant scholarly recommendations for strengthening state institutions, foreign policies promoting liberal
democracy should ensure the ultimate institutional configuration of power in aspirant democracies favours
parliaments over executives for more auspicious outcomes.
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Exterminating armed conflicts and wars remains one of the greatest challenges to 
social science scholars and policy makers.  The prospect of preventing battle-related deaths, 
injuries, infrastructural damages, disruption of basic amenities, human displacements, food 
shortages, and malnutrition render the quest for peace ubiquitously noble.  The last quarter of 
the twentieth century witnessed remarkable progress in peace research, with almost a 
universal consensus reached on what became known as the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), 
that, democracies almost never fight each other (Doyle, 1983; Weede, 1984; Russett, 1995).  
So strong was the evidence in the theory’s support that it was hailed an empirical law (Levy, 
1988).  Going by the DPT, it is to be expected that spreading and preserving democracy 
world-wide would induce global peace.  Accordingly, several major democratic state leaders 
have advocated the spread of democracy globally and committed part of their foreign policies 
towards global democratization. 
For instance, Margaret Thatcher, a former British Prime Minister, asserted during her 
visit to Czechoslovakia in 1990 that, “if we can create a great area of democracy…that would 
give us the best guarantee of all for security—because democracies don’t go to war with one 
another” (Sheehan, 2005, p. 32).  Thatcher was substantively echoed by a former U.S. 
president, Bill Clinton, who declared in his 1994 State of the Union address that, “ultimately, 
the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support…democracy 
elsewhere.  Democracies don’t attack each other” (Sheehan, 2005, p. 32).  Most recently, 
another ex-U.S. president, George W. Bush, in making a case for the democratization of the 
Middle East, posited that, “the reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t 
go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace” (The White 
House, 2004).  Even the European Security Strategy stipulates that the best guarantee for 
international security is a world of well governed democratic states (Cooper, 2003, p. 165). 
Towards the close of the twentieth century, some scholars, specifically Edward 
Mansfield and Jack Snyder, controversially observed and argued that, rather than reducing 
wars and guaranteeing peace, the process of building democracy (democratization) increases 
war propensity.  Recent waves of democratic protests and autocratic repressions have 
triggered civil wars and threatened, or yielded, militarized interventions in Syria, Libya, and 
Côte d’Ivoire, revitalizing Mansfield and Snyder’s democratization and (intra/inter-state) war 
linkage.  Mansfield and Snyder (1995a; 1995b; 1996) initially endorsed the democratic peace 
thesis, but portrayed the path to democracy as prone to diversionary war derailments by 
threatened autocratic incumbents resisting democratic change.  
Reacting to criticisms either problematizing their research design (Enterline, 1996; 
Thompson & Tucker, 1997a; 1997b) or mounting contrasting evidence that democratization 
averts violence (Wolf, 1996; Ward & Gleditsch, 1998; 2000), Mansfield and Snyder (2002; 
2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008; including Snyder, 2000; 2004) refined their design and 
incorporated institutional strength as the source of variations in the war propensities of 
democratizing states: the stronger a democratizer’s governmental institutions, the greater its 
capacity to effectively manage increased popular participation in politics and to control elite 
rivalry in ways that mitigate risks of hostilities.  The authors’ newer research finds 
incompletely democratizing states (transitioning from autocracy to mixed or anocratic 
regimes) to be more war-prone than complete democratizers (culminating in coherent 
democracy), principally because of the predominance of weak/incoherent democratic 
institutions in the former category.  
By policy implication, democracy-building “should be accompanied by efforts to 
mould strong, centralized institutions” (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002, p. 334).  Renowned 
international relations scholars, including Samuel Huntington, Fareed Zakaria, Thomas 
Carothers, Joshua Cohen, Allan Stam and Cindy Skach, have explicitly endorsed Mansfield 
and Snyder’s latter work (2005a, back cover) as a foreign policy instructive text on peaceful 
democratization.  Further popularizing the authors’ work is the publicity it has garnered from 
prominent international media such as the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, 
and National Public Radio (Narang & Nelson, 2009, p. 358). 
Critically, however, Mansfield and Snyder’s research design overemphasizes the 
impact of the chief executive on foreign policy outcomes.  Specifically, the authors derive 
measures of institutional strength from an index, DomConcentration, which gauges the 
concentration of power in central governments.  But almost all six component indicators of 
institutional strength focus on the executive, overlooking the other branches of government.  
This marginalization of the other arms of government is problematic at two levels: at the 
empirical level, it misses the influence or constraints the legislature and the judiciary might 
wield over executive foreign policy decision making; at the policy level, strengthening the 
executive without concurrent amplification of the other branches potentially has the danger of 
counterproductively inducing unchecked diversionary belligerency by powerful incumbents 
seeking to sustain political survival through rash foreign adventures.  
To contribute towards mitigating this marginalization, the armed conflict 
participations of democratizing states are herein articulated as fundamentally contingent, at 
least in part, on the strength of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive.  In theory, powerful 
parliaments can restrict the diversionary conflict proclivities of democratizing states by, for 
instance, refusing to fund military operations, or more extremely, by revising state laws to 
curb executive military powers, including powers to wage wars.  To assess the hypothesized 
influence of parliaments on democratizing states’ conflict propensities, this article further 
conducts a binary logistic regression assessment covering the immediate post-Cold War 
period packed with third wave democratization processes that are not covered in most extant 
democratization and war studies.  At least some empirical support is found for the postulated 
negative correlation between parliamentary strength and democratizer belligerency.  Hence, 
whilst heeding to Mansfield and Snyder’s call for strong central institutions to accompany 
democratization, foreign policies promoting democracy for peace need to ensure the 
institutional balance of power favours parliaments over executives.  
Apart from its bearing on foreign policy, this study illuminates current empirical 
controversy on democratization, institutional strength, and inter-state belligerency.  While 
Mansfield and Snyder (2002; 2005a; 2005b) depict incompletely democratizing states with 
weak institutions as more susceptible to wars than other regime-types, a recent re-evaluation 
by Narang and Nelson (2009) does not find corroborative evidence.  Rather, the latter study 
finds “a dearth of observations where incomplete democratizers with weak institutions 
participated in war” (p. 357).  Thus, it posits: “incomplete democratizers with weak 
institutions are no more likely to go to war than other types of states” (p. 368).  Spanning the 
1990s explicitly acknowledged by Mansfield and Snyder (2002) as a “decade of […] 
democratization” (p. 297), but not covered by either pair of scholars on either side of the 
extant empirical divide, another re-evaluation (Che, 2014, p. 3) finds only feeble evidence in 
support of Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis.  
By turning attention to legislatures, away from extant focus on executives, in 
measurements of institutional strength, and by focusing on militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs) instead of full scale wars often used to gauge democratizer belligerency, this article 
ventilates the new empirical controversy on democratization and inter-state belligerency with 
fresh perspectives.  As already noted, the empirical evaluation herein evinces parliamentary 
strength differences as impactful on democratizers’ (non)involvement in MIDs.  This 
indicates empirical support for Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis linking democratization, 
institutional strength, and war whilst undermining Narang and Nelson’s antithesis.  
Proceeding in three parts, this paper begins with a review of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-
2011 internal and internationalized post-election militarized crisis as emblematic of the 
dangers of holding transitional elections without effective legislative protection of public 
courts and electoral commissions from executive manipulation.  The review inspires and 
justifies broader cross-country analysis of the proposed relationship between legislative 
strength and democratizer belligerency.  Concurrently, the review debunks received wisdom 
linking Côte d’Ivoire’s judiciary and electoral commission to the country’s international 
crisis as overly simplistic, and assesses the extent to which conflict-predicting variables other 
than legislative strength contributed to the outbreak of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 militarized 
crisis.  
Next, the paper postulates how the most powerful parliaments can exert constraints on 
foreign policy decision making on military force usage by the chief executive.  Through the 
theoretical outline, parliamentary strength is projected as a relevant condition determining 
democratizing states’ participation, or non-participation, in armed international conflicts. 
Throughout this article, parliamentary strength/power specifically relates to the extent of 
leverage exercised by the legislature over the executive arm of government.  
Finally, the article outlines its empirical evaluative design, and reports associated 
empirical results and their policy implication.  The evaluation of the linkage between 
parliamentary strength and democratizer belligerency employs logistic regression analysis, 
controlling for the effects of other major belligerency determinants (democratization degree, 
ethnopolitical polarization, trade dependency, and national material capabilities), some of 
which are reflected in discussions of the instructive Ivorian case study.  The scope of the 
evaluation covers all post-Cold War democratizers from 1989 – 2010 (N = 425), with a 
monadic (democratizer-year) unit of analysis used.  
Reviewing the Institutional Sources of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 Post-election Crisis 
When Mansfield and Snyder (2002) first analysed the relevance of institutional 
strength to the democratization – war linkage, they concluded by explicitly advocating “the 
formation of impartial courts and election commissions” as part of their prescription for 
averting the dangers of democratization (p. 334).  However, as with other specific normative 
institutional reform recommendations constituting their prescriptive package, the authors 
failed to argue the association implied between the judiciary, elections, and risks of violence.  
Building on Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 post-election crisis, a group of democratization and 
war scholars (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013) cleared the above gap with a large-n study 
linking elections and incentives for armed [ethnic] civil violence.  Aligned with prevailing 
perceptions of Côte d’Ivoire’s recent crisis, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug accentuate the 
Ivorian Constitutional Council’s partiality—for then-incumbent state leader Laurent 
Gbagbo—as the institutional source of incentives for the country’s 2010-2011 violent crisis 
(p. 391).  
This section reconstructs the Constitutional Council’s prejudice as a product of 
excessive executive power, presaged and facilitated by limited legislative leverage over the 
executive.  The reconstruction substantiates the rationale for quantitative tests of the 
postulated linkage between parliamentary power and democratizer belligerency.  
Accordingly, efforts are made to ensure the reconstruction simulates a mini-case study of the 
hypothesized impact of parliamentary strength on democratizer belligerency, with details of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 exhibition of international belligerency provided.  To render the 
Ivorian review more consistent with subsequent quantitative logistic regression analysis 
incorporating control variables, this section concludes with a reflection on the extent to which 
two key foreign belligerency predictor variables (democratization degree and ethnopolitical 
polarization) other than parliamentary strength might have contributed to the outbreak of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s internationalized crisis.  
Côte d’Ivoire’s Conflict-Plagued Democratization Process  
Prior to reviewing the institutional link between democratization and the recent crisis 
in Côte d’Ivoire, a regime characterization of that country as democratizing warrants 
explication.  Upon gaining independence from colonial rule in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire, like 
several other sub-Saharan African states, came under one-party dictatorship.  Transition from 
that dictatorship to competitive multi-party democracy commenced with the organization of 
multi-party and multi-candidate presidential elections in 1990.  However, Côte d’Ivoire and 
sub-Saharan Africa’s drive to democracy since the early 1990s is marked by “profound flaws, 
rollbacks or setbacks.”  Through the infamous ethnopolitical exclusionary doctrine of 
Ivoirité, second generation economic immigrants such as current state president Alassane 
Ouattara, though born in Côte d’Ivoire, were considered not to be “true Ivorians” due to their 
parents’ immigrant status and were systematically barred from contesting (and voting in) the 
presidential elections of 1995 and 2000 (Bovcon, 2009, p.2). 
Exclusionary politics of belonging metamorphosed to a protracted civil war in 2002, 
splitting the country between a rebel-held, mainly Muslim North and a government-
controlled, chiefly Christian South.  Peace negotiations resulting in the Linas-Macoussis 
(2003), Accra II and III (2003; 2004), Pretoria (2005), and Ouagadougou (2007) political 
agreements sought (at least in part) to broaden political participation and induce a more 
inclusive, competitive and comprehensive form of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire.  Based on the 
peace agreements, Ouattara was permitted to run for presidential elections and a more 
inclusive electoral roll was compiled through a new citizenship identification process 
involving “mobile court hearings” (Mehler, Melber, & Van Walraven, 2008, p. 81). 
The 2010-2011 Militarized International Dispute in Retrospect 
Designed to culminate transition—coded -88 (planned transition) on the Polity IV 
index—from exclusionary, belligerent and incoherent democratic politics to inclusive, 
peaceful and coherent democracy, preparations for post-war elections between 2007 and 2009 
failed to forestall violence following the presidential polls of 2010.  Côte d’Ivoire relapsed to 
violence after incumbent Gbagbo, “with the help of the Constitutional Council” (Cederman, 
Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013, p. 391), refused to relinquish power despite the country’s 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) declaring Ouattara winner.  International 
intervention by French and U.N. peacekeeping forces to defend the CEI’s U.N.-certified 
verdict, and to protect civilians, resulted in an international militarized dispute between the 
foreign forces and Gbagbo’s military. 
From day one at the helm, Gbagbo exhibited total commitment toward keeping power 
in ways not unanticipated by political survival theorists, most evidently in his tendencies to 
invoke Ivoirité against Northerners and settler immigrants, and to brutally repress rebellions.  
Unwilling to relinquish power, Gbagbo defiantly insisted he won the November 2010 
presidential run-off and refused to cede power even after foreign powers endorsed his 
challenger.  Keen to promote democracy by upholding CEI’s verdict, various international 
leaders pressed Gbagbo to quit.  For instance, then-French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
described Ouattara’s victory as “uncontestable and certain” (Bax & Monnier, 2010).  U.S. 
president, Barack Obama, warned, “the international community would hold those who act to 
thwart the democratic process and the will of the electorate accountable for their actions” 
(Bax & Monnier, 2010).  Gbagbo’s defiance pushed the West African regional organization 
(ECOWAS) to suspend Côte d’Ivoire from the bloc.  International calls for Gbagbo to 
relinquish power appeared futile as Gbagbo continued to hang-on (BBC News, 2010).  
Gbagbo’s regime became increasingly hostile towards foreign powers, especially 
France.  As observed by Piccolino (2012), the regime sought to neutralize U.N. and French 
threats to his political survival by whipping up anti-colonial nationalist sentiments.  Gbagbo’s 
belligerent nationalist campaign was a diversionary survival strategy designed to revive his 
domestic popularity and mobilize mass support for his regime.  Blé Goudé, then-Minister of 
Youth and Employment, peculiarly served as Gbagbo’s Street General, mobilizing Young 
Patriots to condemn French presence in the country.  Toward the end of 2010, Gbagbo 
contumaciously ordered foreign peacekeepers to depart, and Interior Minister Guirieoulou 
followed on to intimidate: “if against our will, they [the U.N.] want to keep this force in our 
country, we won’t co-operate with them” (BBC News, 2010).  Between January and April 
2011, perhaps hoping obdurate defiance would earn him at least a consociational deal, 
Gbagbo’s military, Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI), unleashed hideous violence 
against Ouattara supporters and against foreign forces (Straus, 2011).  However, as noted by 
Straus, inhumane acts were also committed by the pro-Ouattara insurgent Forces Nouvelles 
(HRW, 2011), renamed Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) following Ouattara’s 
election victory.  
Instead of departing as ordered in 2010, the U.N. passed Resolution 1962 (December 
2010) extending its peacekeeping mandate in Côte d’Ivoire.  Additionally, the U.N. fortified 
its forces via a series of other Security Council Resolutions.  In January 2011, the Council 
adopted Resolution 1967 deploying 2,000 military personnel to bolster the UN’s operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) whilst stressing its authorization to the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative “to use all necessary means to carry out UNOCI’s mandate, including 
protection of civilians” (article 8).  Even before the passing of Resolution 1967, the Council 
had sanctioned an increase in UNOCI’s forces from 8,650 to 9,150 (Resolution 1942, 
September 2010).  Also, it had authorized prior to the presidential elections run-off a 
temporal transfer from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI of up to 
three battalions of ground soldiers and an aviation unit composed of two military helicopters 
(Resolution 1951, November 2010).  On its part, France boosted la force Licorne with an 
additional 300 contingents (Laing, 2011).  
Armed power rivalry between FACI forces and FRCI rebels remained deadlocked 
until April 2011 when UNOCI and Licorne air assaults on FACI bases in Abidjan crushed 
Gbagbo’s military resilience.  Unable to counter the foreign military assaults, several FACI 
soldiers defected from Gbagbo’s desperate survival struggle, leaving only about 1,000 die-
hard warriors (Rice, 2011) to resist Licorne helicopter onslaughts on the presidential palace.  
French air strikes overpowered Gbagbo’s remaining FACI loyalists at the presidential 
residence and paved the way for his arrest by FRCI rebels on April 11, 2011, terminating 
Gbagbo’s decade-long strong hold on power. 
Implicating the Legislature in Côte d’Ivoire’s Crisis 
Admittedly, the Constitutional Council’s biased decision to overturn CEI’s verdict 
ensured an outbreak of violence in the absence of alternative neutral electoral dispute 
arbitration avenues.  Critically, however, the Council’s bias was hardly an independent 
initiative of the judiciary.  Rather, in hindsight, it was an inevitable consequence of 
legislative failures to curb excessive executive powers and ensure effective independence for 
the CEI and the judiciary.  Constitutionally, and presumably conscious of the normative 
governance principle of checks and balances, Côte d’Ivoire’s unicameral legislature (the 
National Assembly) shares powers of judicial appointments with the chief executive.  The 
National Assembly has a role in the appointment of members of the Constitutional Council 
(see the Ivorian Constitution adopted in 2000, art. 89), the Superior Council of the 
Magistrature (art. 105), and the High Court (art. 108).  In practice, however, as noted in Fish 
and Kroenig’s (2009) global survey of national legislatures, the National Assembly has 
limited powers (with a parliamentary power score of 0.38/1) (pp. 169-173), and “does not 
play a part in judicial appointments” (p. 169).  The National Assembly’s weakness, partially 
marked by its passivity in judicial appointments, enables a leeway for unilateral presidential 
manipulation of the judiciary.  Gbagbo ostensibly exploited this leeway by stuffing the 
judiciary, especially the Constitutional Council, with staunch loyalists, orchestrating judicial 
prejudice (U.S. Department of State, 2004). 
Accordingly, Gbagbo’s longstanding political ally, personal friend and academic 
colleague, Paul N’dre, whilst heading the Constitutional Council, ostensibly faced partisan 
pressure to nullify, and even overturn, CEI’s verdict without judicial verification of electoral 
malpractice allegations.  After all, as noted by one New York Times Ivorian interviewee, 
when “you put your friend at the head of an institution, you know what the result is going to 
be” (Nossiter, 2010).  Lack of legislative protection for CEI’s nominally exclusive powers to 
proclaim election results only served to legitimise N’dre’s pro-Gbagbo partiality, mindful of 
the Constitutional Council’s constitutionally embedded election results’ proclamation 
powers.  Retrospectively, had Côte d’Ivoire’s legislature ensured exclusive proclamation 
powers for CEI, and had it insulated the judiciary from executive manipulation, it could have 
averted the country’s 2010-2011 crisis and related international intervention.  Côte d’Ivoire’s 
experience illustrates the primacy of parliamentary power in institutional analysis of the 
conflict propensities of democratizing states.  
Incomplete Democratization, Ethnopolitical Polarization, and Côte d’Ivoire’s Crisis 
Whilst associating Côte d’Ivoire’s weak parliament with the country’s 2010-2011 
crisis, it is imperative to assess the extent to which other conflict-predicting factors might 
have affected the outbreak of the crisis.  Assessing the possible contribution of other 
determinants of foreign belligerency to the crisis would provide robustness checks vis-à-vis 
the asserted connection between parliamentary strength and the crisis, whilst clarifying the 
rationale for incorporating control variables in subsequent evaluative quantitative analysis.  
Of the several correlates of armed conflict identified by realists and liberal institutionalists, 
two are most prominently related to the varying conflict behaviour of democratizing states, 
namely level or degree of democratization (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; 2005a; 2005b) and 
ethnopolitical polarization (Che, 2014).  
Degree of democratization.  Mansfield and Snyder (2002; 2005a; 2005b) depict 
incompletely democratizing states with weak institutions as being more conflict-prone than 
completely democratizing ones with strong political institutions.  The various institutional 
constraints (including separation of powers, uncensored media outlets, and political 
accountability) that engender discreet foreign policies and a separate peace among 
democracies also yield lower levels of belligerency for transitions culminating in coherent 
democracy (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002, pp.300–301).  Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic reform 
programme instituted in 2007 as part of the country’s peace-building agreements following 
its earlier mentioned civil war of 2002 led to the organisation of presidential elections in 
2010, but did not produce coherent democracy.  In addition to allegations of voting 
irregularities and contestations of vote counts by Gbagbo and Ouattara, political power 
remained concentrated with the executive, the print and audio-visual media remained 
intensely censored (RSF, 2011), and in the absence of an assertive legislature and an 
autonomous judiciary, there were hardly any constraints on the executive.  
Testament to its incipient democratization status, Côte d’Ivoire, following the 
adoption of its peace- and democracy-building programme in 2007 (coded -88 on the Polity 
IV index), attained only an incoherent democratic polity score (+4) by 2011 (based on 
Mansfield and Snyder’s [2002, p.313; 2005a, p.79] regime change measurement criteria) 
when the country’s crisis escalated to international violence involving U.N. and French 
forces. Freedom House, another liberal democracy index, continued to rate Côte d’Ivoire as 
Not Free between 2007 and 2011.  Weak democratic institutional constraints on Gbagbo 
presumably provided the former leader and his close collaborators incentives to discount the 
CEI’s verdict and to whip up anti-French nationalist sentiments (BBC News, 2010), spiralling 
the country into armed conflict with France.  However, it was the failure of the country’s 
National Assembly to bestow the CEI with election result proclamation powers and to 
institute diverse institutional checks on executive authority that provided the foundation for 
weak democratic institutional constraints and for the 2010-2011 crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Ethnopolitical polarization.  Deep division or polarization between ethnic groups 
controlling power and those marginalized or excluded from it also increases the danger of a 
democratizer becoming involved in civil and diversionary foreign conflicts (Mousseau, 2001; 
Che, 2014).  Polarization spurs grievances and provides incentives for the authority and 
legitimacy of the government and its institutions to be challenged by excluded and 
discriminated groups.  The exclusionary doctrine of Ivoirité mentioned earlier effectively 
polarized Côte d’Ivoire between Ouattara (barred from participating in elections under the 
xenophobic doctrine) and his supporters in the rebel-held, predominantly Muslim North on 
the one hand, and Gbagbo’s regime and its loyalists in the chiefly Christian South on the 
other.  
However, peace-building agreements in the aftermath of the 2002 civil war 
substantially mitigated polarization in the Ivorian polity, with Ouattara allowed to run for 
presidential elections and a much broader electoral roll compiled, while relying on a new, 
more inclusive citizenship identification process (Mehler, Melber, & Van Walraven, 2008, p. 
81).  Hence, the Ethnic Power Relations index used in some studies (including Che, 2014) to 
measure ethnopolitical polarization observes an absence of polarization in Côte d’Ivoire in 
the years immediately preceding the 2010-2011 crisis, with no ethnic group recorded as either 
dominating political power or being systematically excluded from it.  
Of the possible sources of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 internationalized post-election 
crisis discussed above, limited legislative leverage over executive action appears pivotal.  
Though the country was democratizing incipiently with weak institutions in general and an 
associated risk of diversionary belligerency (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; 2005a), it was the 
National Assembly’s weakness and failure to effectively separate powers between the 
different arms of government that ensured institutions were generally weak, with limited 
constraints on the chief executive.  Also, though weak, the country’s state institutions, 
including the elections management body CEI, harboured undisputed legitimacy on the eve 
of the 2010 elections.  As already noted, the 2002 civil war sharply divided the country 
between a rebel-held, Muslim North and a government-controlled, Christian South.  
However, several peace agreements in the aftermath of the civil war mitigated ethnopolitical 
polarization and culminated in the holding of the 2010 elections.  Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010-2011 
internationalized civil conflict was, at least in part, a function of excessive executive powers 
and limited legislative leverage. 
  
How Parliaments Potentially Impact Democratizing Executives’                                         
External Diversionary Incentives 
Parliamentary impact on (election-related) civil conflict onset in transitional 
democracies is, as demonstrated by the Ivorian case, dependent on legislative protection for 
autonomous judicial and electoral institutions.  However, vis-à-vis diversionary international 
belligerency, there is presumably greater potential for a more direct parliamentary impact.  
This provides a stronger premise for empirical evaluations linking democratization, 
parliamentary power, and inter-state conflicts, as opposed to evaluations focused on intra-
state conflicts.  Prior to the empirical analysis, an outline of prominent parliamentary powers 
that permit direct leverage over democratizing executives’ external diversionary conflict 
decision-making is imperative.  
Six typical (but not universal) parliamentary powers potentially impacting executives’ 
external diversionary proclivities immediately come to mind, namely: 1) powers to regulate 
appointments to top administrative positions, especially cabinet portfolios bearing on foreign 
relations and state defence management; 2) powers to summon and investigate executive 
officials; 3) powers to select and impeach the chief executive/commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces; 4) powers to (dis)approve proposed executive budgets and monitor executive 
spending; 5) powers to declare wars and sanction executive calls for foreign military actions 
that do not necessarily amount to full-scale wars; and most prominently, and 6) powers to 
enact and revise constitutional laws regulating all the above powers, though constitutional 
amendments may be subject to executive approval (as in Belarus, Cameroon, and Oman) or 
popular approval via referendums (as in Algeria, Guinea, and Paraguay).  Fish and Kroenig 
(2009) provide a comprehensive outline of typical parliamentary powers over the executive, 
alongside empirical country studies.  
These classical parliamentary powers are commonly acknowledged as veritable 
indicators of (parliamentary-based) executive constraints in major datasets measuring such 
constraints, including the Parliamentary Powers Index (Fish & Kroenig, 2009), the Polity 
Index (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002, pp. 23–24), and the Political Constraints Index (Henisz, 
2002).  However, as noted earlier, the effect of parliamentary constraints (or the absence 
thereof) on diversionary-motivated democratizing executives remains empirically unverified.  
It is assumed here that strong parliaments (inducing strong executive constraints) can 
effectively stall or avert unpopular executive diversionary military expeditions and can 
ultimately hold venturesome executives accountable.  In states undergoing democratic 
transition, strong parliaments imply curbed executive capacities to belligerently seek foreign 
policy victories and procure prestige to sustain political survival.  Contrastingly, weak 
parliaments (inducing weak executive constraints) permit a leeway for unilateral executive 
externalisations whilst ensuring reckless state leaders can avoid public accountability.  In 
transitional democracies, weak parliaments imply increased incentives for chief executives to 
boost leadership survival through diversionary militarized conflicts.  Thus, it is hypothesized: 
Democratizing states with weak parliaments are more likely to engage in MIDs than 
democratizers with strong parliaments. 
Research Design 
To assess the hypothesized effect of parliamentary strength on democratizing states’ 
conflict propensities, a binary logistic regression is executed for all democratizers (N = 425) 
in the post-Cold War period whilst controlling for the effects of other possible predictors of 
democratizer belligerency (degree of democratization, ethnopolitical polarization, trade 
dependency, and national material capabilities).  The (democratizer) country-year constitutes 
the unit of analysis with measurements of democratization mimicking Mansfield and 
Snyder’s (2002, p. 313; 2005a, p. 79) criteria, but executed over five-year periods ending 
with each year covered in the study (1989–2010).  The independent variable, parliamentary 
strength of democratizers, is gauged from Henisz’s (2002) Political Constraint Index.  The 
dependent variable, democratizers’ conflict propensities, is measured from MID (as opposed 
to full-scale wars) participations, with the temporal scope of the study focusing on the post-
Cold War period (1989–2010) packed with democratization cases that are not covered in 
extant democratization and war studies.  
The scope of existing institutional studies of the democratization—belligerency nexus 
(Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; 2005a; Narang & Nelson, 2009) does not exceed 1992, covering 
only the pre-Cold and Cold War epochs marked by imperialistic ambitions in the global 
North, anti-colonial resentment in the South and a clash of ideologies between the East and 
the West, all of which stoked wars.  While wars occurred frequently prior to the end of the 
Cold War, democracy and democratizing states were limited, proliferating only after the 
Soviet Union collapsed (Salih, 2001, p. 4).  Thus, by focusing on the post-Cold War era, this 
study extends the temporal scope of institutional studies of democratization and war, and 
allows for a richer and global sample of ‘third wave’ democratizers against which to conduct 
the empirical analysis of interest. 
Dependent Variable 
Extant studies of the democratization—belligerency nexus (including Mansfield and 
Snyder’s prominent works) predominantly focus on war as their dependent variable.  
However, this is problematic as many democratizing states are small states without the 
military, economic, or technological capability to engage in warfare, but they do threaten, 
display and actually use less severe military force (Enterline, 1996, p. 185).  Hence, this study 
uses MIDs (as against wars) to gauge belligerency, thereby checking against the exclusion of 
non-major powers with limited war capabilities from the research. 
Democratizing states become involved in conflicts either as diversionary initiators or 
targets of attacks from opportunistic adversaries seeking to take advantage of the fierce elite 
rivalry and belligerent nationalist politics that plague democratizers (Mansfield & Snyder, 
2002; 2005a).  Accordingly, this empirical section operationalizes the dependent variable as 
participation in at least one MID—as initiator or target—that started in the end-year of the 
five-year interval over which democratization is measured.  Gauging MID participation, 
MIDPART, from only one year of the democratization measurement interval, rather than the 
entire five-year measurement interval, guarantees at least some statistical independence 
between observations of democratization and belligerency.  MIDPART data is derived from 
the Correlates of War (COW) project’s MID-level dataset on MID participants, version 4.1 
(Palmer et al., 2015).  The last year coded in this latest COW version of MID data is 2010.  
Hence, the post-Cold War temporal scope of this study ends in 2010.  MIDPART takes the 
value one (1) for democratizers that were participants in at least one MID that began in the 
last year of the five-year democratic regime change measurement interval and zero (0) 
otherwise.  
Independent Variable 
Since the hypothesis of interest concerns only democratizing states, the empirical 
assessment evaluates democratizers exclusively.  Initial quantitative studies propounding 
(Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a; 1995b; 1996) and challenging (e.g. Ward & Gleditsch, 1998; 
2000) the democratization – war nexus plausibly assess the conflict behaviour of both 
democratizers and non-democratizers to determine if democratizers are disproportionately 
conflict-prone.  In response to criticisms of their democratization – war linkage, Mansfield 
and Snyder (2002; 2005a) clarify conditions under which democratization is likely to increase 
incentives for international belligerency, accentuating the risk of democratizing incipiently 
with weak institutions.  However, as noted earlier, this revised thesis, which explains the 
different conflict propensities of democratizers as a function of disparate degrees of 
democratization, has been challenged by Narang and Nelson (2009, p.357) who find ‘a 
dearth’ of supportive evidence.  To contribute toward clarifying this newer controversy 
concerning democratizing states solely, the current assessment of the effect of parliamentary 
strength on the varying MID proclivities of democratizing states examines only 
democratizing states, excluding all non-democratizers from the research design. 
Hence, before measuring the independent variable (parliamentary strength of 
democratizers), it is imperative to first identify all democratizers in the period under study.  
Democratizing states, DEMZ, are coded one (1) if over a five-year period (t1 – t6) ending in 
each year under study (1989–2010), their polity scores (as captured in the Polity IV index) 
changed from an autocratic value (< -6) to either an anocratic (ranging from -6 to +6) or 
democratic one (> +6), or from an anocratic score to a democratic one.  All other 
observations, that is, stable and autocratizing regimes, are coded zero (0) under DEMZ.  The 
procedure for coding democratizing states here simulates the Mansfield and Snyder (2002, p. 
313; 2005a, p. 79) commonly-used criteria, although the codes are derived from the more 
recent Polity IV index (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014).  The Polity index assesses the 
democratic and autocratic characteristics of authority in all independent countries with a 
population greater than 500,000.  Polity scores are captured on a 21-point scale ranging from 
-10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic), with the composite score determined by the 
following component indicators: openness of executive recruitment, constraints on executive 
authority, and popular political participation.  While using the Polity IV index to measure 
democratic regime change, this study’s first data entry observation for each state gauges 
democratization between 1984 and 1989, and MID participation in 1989.  Upon identifying 
all democratizers and eliminating all non-democratizers from the data entry sheet, the 
research proceeds to measure the independent variable, parliamentary power of 
democratizers.  
To gauge parliamentary strength, this work jettisons Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) 
Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI)—frequently used in quantitative studies involving 
parliamentary analysis—for Henisz’s (2002) Political Constraint Index (POLCONIII).  Post-
2002 measurements of parliamentary strength are derived from the updated version of 
POLCONIII (2013 release).  Consistent with the reasoning linking parliamentary strength, 
democratization and belligerency, POLCONIII measures parliamentary power specifically 
from the extent of executive constraints induced by the national legislature (EXCONIIIL).  
Using a simple spatial model of political interaction, POLCONIII rates legislative constraints 
on the executive as minimal or absent (scoring 0) in the absence of a legislature.  Each 
additional legislative institution (chamber) controlled by a political party different from the 
one(s) controlling other branches of government has a positive but diminishing effect on the 
total level of constraints on executive capacity to alter government policy.  POLCONIII 
yields a maximum score (1) where policy preferences within the legislature are homogenous 
but diametrically opposed to those of the executive.  The index deduces the policy 
preferences of the executive and legislative arms of government from the policy positions of 
the political parties that dominate the different branches of government.  By incorporating 
(intra- and inter-) institutional configurations of policy preferences in its calculations, 
POLCONIII, unlike the PPI index, plausibly demonstrates sensitivity to a major potential 
source of temporal variations in legislative leverage.  Testament to this, POLCONIII scores 
are temporally fluid (changing over time), not absolute or fixed. 
While POLCONIII measures parliamentary strength solely in terms of degree of 
legislative leverage over the executive, PPI is overly aggregative, with component elements 
covering up to 32 items, only nine of which specifically captures legislative sway over the 
executive.  Calculations of aggregate PPI scores attach equal value to all 32 survey items, 
irrespective of survey categories.  This problematically implies that a legislature with more 
check marks under institutional resources (covering items like number of parliamentary 
sessions, personal secretaries and nonsecretarial staff) than under institutional sway 
(incorporating items as powers to monitor, interpolate, investigate, and impeach/replace 
executive officials) is rated as equally powerful as another legislature with reversed numbers 
of affirmative indicators under the distinct survey categories.  
POLCONIII is not without weaknesses.  Most evidently, it uses political identity 
(party affiliation) as the sole source of (institutional) legislative policy preferences.  This 
disregards the relevance of other potential preference determinants such as education, 
religion, gender, and wealth, which may not necessarily coincide with party cleavages, 
particularly vis-à-vis debates on aggressive foreign policies.  Even if policy preferences were 
exclusively based on party identities, there would yet be the challenge of discerning 
majoritarian preferences for extremely fragmented multiparty parliaments wherein ruling 
majorities might not be singular parties but coalitions with diverse preferences.  Credibly, 
however, in the absence of data on party fractionalization (within ruling majorities), Henisz 
(2002) addresses fractionalization problems loosely at the parliamentary level as against the 
party coalitional level, treating the former as an imperfect proxy for the latter. 
Control Variables 
To ensure robustness in analysis of the hypothesized linkage between parliamentary 
power and democratizers’ varying conflict propensities, a few control variables are added to 
the baseline regression model.  Because trade promotes peace by increasing transnational ties 
and the opportunity costs of military conflicts (Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum, 2003; McDonald, 
2004), I draw on the commercial peace thesis to include DEPENDL as a control variable.  
DEPENDL measures the dependency of democratizing states on commercial relations from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators databank (total trade as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product).  The commercial peace thesis expects a negative correlation 
between DEPENDL and MID propensities: lower levels of dependency on trade should 
induce lesser constraints on foreign policy, yielding greater MID proclivities.  Because the 
capacity to exercise and resist influence in the international system may increase incentives 
and opportunities for militarized conflicts, I also control for the material capabilities of 
democratizing states.  The COW project’s composite index of national material capabilities, 
using diverse (demographic, industrial, and military) component indicators, is employed to 
gauge national capacity, NACAPH, with higher values expected to correlate with greater MID 
participations.  
More prominently associated with determinants of democratizing states’ varying 
conflict propensities are degrees of democratization (incomplete/complete) and ethnopolitical 
polarization (polarized/non-polarized).  The cultural and institutional constraints associated 
with established democratic states and their separate democratic peace are absent or weak in 
newly and incompletely democratizing states.  Marginal constraints render incompletely 
democratizing states more conflict-prone than completely democratizing states with enhanced 
and stronger constraints (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; 2005a; 2005b).  Although some scholars 
(e.g. Narang & Nelson, 2009) have challenged Mansfield and Snyder’s evidence linking 
democratization degrees, institutional strength, and belligerency, this study, nevertheless, 
controls for the possibility that incomplete democratization, INCOMDEZ, renders a state 
more conflict-prone.  INCOMDEZ is a dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if over the five-
year intervals used in measuring democratization a democratic regime change is incomplete, 
with its polity score moving from an autocratic value (< -6) to an anocratic value (-6 to +6).  
For complete democratic regime changes wherein polity scores move from either autocratic 
or anocratic to coherent democratic values (> +6), INCOMDEZ is coded zero (0). 
In ethnopolitically polarized systems, the ethnic exclusionary nature of political 
institutions provides incentives for the institutions’ authority and legitimacy to be challenged 
by excluded and discriminated ethnic groups—as the Hutu did in Burundi in the post-
independence period of Tutsi domination (Uvin, 1999, p. 31).  Thus, irrespective of the 
degree of democratization and strength of institutions, the danger of internal and diversionary 
international conflicts looms in ethnopolitically polarized democratizers, relative to non-
polarized ones.  Testament to this argument, Che (2014) has found statistical evidence 
projecting ethnopolitical polarization as a superior predictor of democratizers’ varying 
conflict propensities, compared to degree of democratization.  
To control for the belligerent danger of democratizing with deep ethnopolitical 
divisions, the baseline regression model includes an additional dichotomous variable, 
ETDEZ, coded one (1) for ethnopolitically polarized democratizing states and zero (0) for 
non-polarized democratizers. Measurements of polarization (or the absence thereof) are 
derived from Vogt et al.’s (2015) updated version of Cederman, Min, and Wimmer’s (2010) 
Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) index.  The measurements replicate the criteria used in Che 
(2014): ETDEZ equals one (1) if at least one component ethnic group of the democratizer 
under observation exercised absolute control of central power or was systematically excluded 
or discriminated against, as per EPR data for the year immediately preceding the end-year of 
the five-year democratization measurement interval.  On the other hand, ETDEZ equals zero 
(0) if neither absolute domination nor systematic discrimination is detected.  
Measurements for polarization are initially executed both for the end-year, and for 
periods of up to three years prior to the end-year of democratization measurement intervals, 
but no significant differences in measurement outcomes are noticed.  However, the statistical 
outputs reported in this paper are specifically generated from measurements for the year 
immediately preceding the end-year of democratization intervals in which MID                        
(non-)participations are observed.  Measuring polarization in the year immediately prior to 
MID (non-)participation credibly ensures that non-overlapping periods are used to gauge 
democratizer polarization and democratizer MID participation in order to leverage at least 
some statistical independence between observations of the control and dependent variables. 
Data for both the predictor (independent and control) and dependent variables are 
entered on the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, version 22.  Since the 
dependent variable (participation in MIDs) is dichotomously measured, the study employs the 
binary logistic regression procedure on SPSS to evaluate the impact of democratizing states’ 
parliamentary strength (EXCONIIIL) on the likelihood of participating in MIDs (MIDPART).  
Empirical Results 
As reported in Table 1 below, the full model containing both the independent variable 
of interest and the other predictor variables is statistically significant at the significance level 
of 0.05 or less, ᵪ2 (5, N = 425) = 26.48, P = 0.000 < 0.05, meaning the model is able to 
differentiate between democratizers that participate in MIDs and those that do not.  The 
model explains between 0.070 (7.1%) to 0.105 (10.5%) of the variance in MID participation 
as indicated by the Cox and Snell R square and the Nagelkerke R square values respectively 
in Table 2.  The model correctly classified the MID (non-)participation categories of 76.3% 
of all democratizing states between 1989 and 2010.                               
 
Table 1:     Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 26.482 5 .000 
Block 26.482 5 .000 
Model 26.482 5 .000 
Test for Statistical Significance of the Model Containing all Predictor Variables 
 
Table 2:                       Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 




1 375.504a .070 .105 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter 
estimates changed by less than .001. 
Degree of Variance in Democratizers’ MID Participations Explained by the Model 
Containing all Predictor Variables 
Logistic Regression Predicting Democratizing States’ Likelihood of Participating in MIDs 
          
Column 4 (Wald test) and column 6 (Sig.) in Table 3 respectively report the volume 
and statistical significance of the contribution of each of the variables in the regression model 
predicting democratizing states’ varying MID propensities.  While three of the control 
variables (trade dependency, ethnopolitical polarization, and material capabilities) each make 
 
Table 3:                                                   Variables in the Model 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a EXCONIIIL -.090 .718 .016 1 .900 .914 .224 3.731 
DEPENDL -.011 .004 5.626 1 .018 .989 .981 .998 
ETDEZ(1) .639 .276 5.365 1 .021 1.894 1.103 3.251 
INCOMDEZ(1) .367 .307 1.430 1 .232 1.443 .791 2.633 
NACAPH 77.467 26.245 8.712 1 .003 4.399 2.011E+11 9.623E+55 
Constant -1.247 .442 7.967 1 .005 .287   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: EXCONIIIL, DEPENDL, ETDEZ, INCOMDEZ, NACAPH. 
a unique statistically significant contribution (P < 0.05) to explaining democratizers’ varying 
MID behaviour, degree of democratization and parliamentary power (P > 0.05) do not.  The 
absence of a statistically significant relationship between degree of democratization and MID 
participation contradicts Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002; 2005a; 2005b) evidence linking 
democratization degree, institutional strength, and war.  But, it is consistent with Narang and 
Nelson’s (2009) re-evaluation of the democratization – war nexus revealing “a dearth of 
observations where incomplete democratizers with weak institutions participated in war” (p. 
357). 
Though substantially relevant, the independent variable of interest, parliamentary 
strength (EXCONIIIL), makes only a marginal and statistically insignificant contribution 
(Wald = 0.016, P = 0.900 > 0.05) to explaining democratizers’ varying MID propensities.  
Nevertheless, at least some support is found for the hypothesized negative correlation 
between parliamentary power and democratizers’ MID vulnerabilities.  The B values in 
column 2 of Table 3 indicate the direction of the relationship between each predictor variable 
and the dependent variable.  The negative coefficient on EXCONIIIL (B = -0.090) suggests 
that democratizers with strong parliaments, which record higher EXCONIIIL values and 
induce greater constraints on executive foreign policy decision-making, are less likely to 
engage in MIDs than democratizers with weak parliaments.  Additional support for this 
negative, albeit statistically insignificant, correlation is provided by EXCONIIIL’s odds ratio, 
which, as reported in column 7 (Exp(B) = 0.914), is less than 1.  This implies that the 
stronger a democratizing state’s parliament becomes, the less likely the democratizer is to 
engage in MIDs: for every reform strengthening legislative constraints on the executive, 
democratizers become 0.914 times less likely to participate in international military conflicts, 
controlling for other factors in the model. 
Conclusion 
Extant institutional analysis of the democratization – belligerency nexus 
problematically measure institutional strength almost exclusively from the executive, 
disregarding the other branches of government.  Skewed institutional strength measurements 
in favour of the executive implicitly miss the constraints other arms of government might 
wield over foreign policy decision-making and dent the quality of extant policy prescriptions 
for promoting democracy in a less risky manner.  Drawing on a review of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
2010-2011 internationalized post-election crisis as a product of excessive executive powers 
and limited legislative leverage, this article sought to contribute towards a more robust 
institutional analysis of the democratization – belligerency linkage by outlining and assessing 
the impact national parliaments induce on the propensity of democratizing states to engage in 
(diversionary) MIDs.  A number of typical, but not universal, parliamentary powers, 
including powers to regulate executive appointments, impeach the chief executive, approve 
executive and military budgets, wage wars, and to enact and revise state laws, were outlined 
as bearing substantively important leverage over executive incentives for military 
externalizations.  
Controlling for the effects of other possible determinants of democratizing states’ 
MID propensities (including democratization degree, ethnopolitical polarization, trade 
dependency, and national material capabilities), the hypothesized impact of parliamentary 
power on democratizers’ MID behaviour was assessed via binary logistic regression analysis 
on SPSS.  The sample of democratizers (N = 425) was drawn from the post-Cold War world 
packed with third wave democratization cases not covered in most institutional studies of the 
democratization – conflict linkage.  Results of the logistic regression reveal at least some 
support, albeit statistically insignificant, for the hypothesis linking parliamentary strength and 
democratizers’ MID vulnerabilities.  The direction of the observed relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables of interest was negative, with an odds ratio less than 
one (1): democratizers with weak parliaments (or, as operationalized in this article, 
parliaments with weak constraints on the executive) participated more frequently in MIDs 
than democratizers with strong parliaments).  
By policy implication, aspiring democracies and newly democratizing states should 
engineer institutional reforms that do not strengthen state institutions indiscriminately.  
Though celebrated as a plausible policy-prescriptive text for democratizing for peace in a safe 
and less risky manner, Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002; 2005a; 2005b) proposal for 
strengthening state institutions prior to mass elections is problematically premised on 
institutional strength measurements focusing on the executive branch of government.  But as 
Côte d’Ivoire’s case study and quantitative analysis in this article suggest, strengthening the 
executive exclusively or alongside other arms government irrespective of the nature of the 
pre-existing distribution of power between the executive and the legislature could be 
counterproductive, raising rather than reducing the danger of MID involvement.  The 
correlation directional evidence in this paper indicates that, when the balance of power 
favours the legislature over the executive, the likelihood of participating in MIDs is 
mitigated, all things being equal.  
Thus, whilst strengthening government institutions as a mechanism for managing the 
danger of international belligerency for democratizing states, democracy-promoting and 
democracy-building policies should ensure the ultimate institutional configuration of power 
favours parliaments over executives for more auspicious outcomes.  However, given the 
statistically significant association between most of the control variables in the regression 
model and democratizers’ MID propensities and the statistically insignificant association 
between parliamentary power and democratizers’ MID proclivities, the various control 
conditions should be addressed alongside reforms strengthening parliamentary constraints on 
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